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Using theories of internal capital markets, this paper examines the link between 
financial market integration and the value of global diversification. Based on a 
sample of 1,491 completed cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
conducted by US acquirers during the 1990–2003 period, we find that, in general, 
US shareholders gain significant positive abnormal returns following the 
announcement of the merger/acquisition. Specifically, firms that acquire/merge 
with targets from countries with financially segmented markets experience 
significantly higher positive abnormal returns than those that acquire/merge with 
targets from countries with financially integrated capital markets. We find that the 
significantly higher positive returns are driven particularly by deals between firms 
from unrelated industries. These firms with higher announcement returns are also 
characterized by positive and significant post-merger operating performance. This 
finding is consistent with our event study results and suggests that the overall 
improvement in the merged firms’ performance is likely due to the influx of 
internal capital from wholly integrated acquirers to segmented targets, firms that, 
on average are usually faced with higher capital constraints. 
 
Key words: financial market integration, global diversification, internal capital 
markets, mergers, acquisitions 
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Mitä yhdysvaltaisten yritysten laajentuminen 
kansainvälisten yrityskauppojen ja -fuusioiden avulla 
kertoo globaalin hajauttamisen eduista yhdentyvillä 
rahoitusmarkkinoilla? 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 24/2006 
Bill B. Francis – Iftekhar Hasan – Xian Sun 




Tässä työssä tutkitaan sisäisten pääomamarkkinoiden teorioita rahoitusmarkkinoi-
den yhdentymisen ja globaaliin hajauttamiseen liittyvien etujen välisten mahdol-
listen yhteyksien avulla. Tutkimuksen otos koostuu ajanjakson 1990–2003 aikana 
toteutetusta 1  491 kansainvälisestä yrityskaupasta ja -fuusiosta, joissa yhtenä 
osapuolena on ollut yhdysvaltalainen yritysostaja. Tutkimustulosten mukaan 
yhdysvaltalaisten osakkeenomistajien voitot ovat kasvaneet epätavallisen paljon 
sen jälkeen, kun yrityskaupasta tai -fuusiosta on tiedotettu julkisuudessa. 
Täsmällisemmin sanoen yritysten voitot kasvavat epätavallisen paljon, kun ne 
ostavat sellaisia yrityksiä tai sulautuvat yhteen sellaisten yritysten kanssa, joiden 
kotimaan rahoitusmarkkinat ovat segmentoituneet. Yrityskauppojen tai -fuusioi-
den tuotot jäävät sen sijaan vähäisemmiksi, kun kaupan tai fuusion kohteena 
olevien yritysten kotimaan rahoitusmarkkinat ovat hyvin integroituneet kansain-
välisiin rahoitusmarkkoihin. Tutkimuksessa osoitetaan myös, että epätavallisen 
suuret tuotot syntyvät erityisesti eri toimialoille kuuluvien yritysten välisistä 
yrityskaupoista. Lisäksi kaupan jälkeinen toiminnallinen tehokkuus kasvaa 
tällaisissa yrityksissä, joiden voitot kasvavat yrityskaupasta tiedotettaessa. 
Tapahtumatutkimuksen tulokset tukevat tätä johtopäätöstä ja viittaavat siihen, että 
fuusioituneiden yritysten tehokkuuden kasvu on seurausta täysin yhdistyneen 
yrityksen sisäisistä pääomavirroista segmentoituneilla markkinoilla toimiville 
yrityksen osille, joiden toimintaa pääomien puute on aiemmin rajoittanut. 
 
Avainsanat: rahoitusmarkkinoiden yhdentyminen, globaali hajauttaminen, sisäiset 
pääomamarkkinat, fuusiot, yrityskaupat 
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In recent years, going global has been a popular trend for many firms. In fact, the 
value of cross-border M&As (one of the major forms of foreign direct 
investments) worldwide has increased more than six-folds during the period 
1991–1998, from US$85 billion in 1991 to US$558 billion in 1998 (Kang and 
Sara, 2000). Theoretical arguments by Morck and Yeung (1992, 1998) suggest 
that global diversification can offer synergistic benefits to the firms due to the 
information-based intangible assets (ie the magnitude of Tobin’s q, superior 
production skills, marketing skills, and management quality). Although these 
arguments are plausible and there are some earlier studies (Doukas, 1995) that 
provide results consistent with the synergy theory, some recent studies however 
report that global diversification is associated with inferior firm performance 
(Denis, Denis and Yost, 2002; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2004). 
  Besides the synergy theory, the existing literature also suggests that the 
benefits (or the costs) of global diversification may as well arise from institutional 
differences between the participating countries such as the tax code, the openness 
of trade, and the magnitude of shareholder protection (see, eg, Scholes and 
Wolfson, 1992; Bodnar et al, 1999; Denis, Denis and Yost, 2002 and Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2004). One of the important institutional differences in the issue of 
global diversification that has not yet received much attention is the status of the 
merging countries’ financial market integration – a proxy of the average firm’s 
ability to access foreign capital in a particular country. 
  In this paper we examine how differences in financial market integration 
across countries impact the performance of firms that diversify globally. We 
contend that by focusing on the issue of financial market integration we will get a 
much better understanding of the value variation among globally diversifying 
firms. This is the case for several reasons. First of all, the existence of financial 
market segmentation provides us with a unique opportunity to test globally the 
hypothesis of internal capital markets (Stein, 1997; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). 
Within the context of firms’ diversifying domestically, Stein’s (1997) ‘winner 
picking’ model of internal capital market predicts that, given the existence of 
capital constraints, an internal capital market will create value by financing 
positive NPV projects which would otherwise be foregone by stand-alone, small 
firms that face difficulties in raising external capital. Although Stein’s arguments 
are developed under the assumption of firms diversifying domestically, they are 
easily transferable to global transactions. 
  As such, we propose that when a pair of merging firms comes from two 
countries with different degrees of financial market integration (a proxy of 
average firms’ ability to access foreign capital in a particular country), the 
benefits of the newly created internal capital market will be larger than those  
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created by a pair of merging firms from countries with similar degrees of financial 
market integration. Because, on average, firms from financially segmented 
markets are more likely to miss opportunities to undertake positive NPV projects 
due to lack of capital than those in integrated capital markets, value could be 
created when firms transfer capital from low growth firms in a given country to 
high growth firms in another but facing more capital constraints. 
  Second, although the literature on cross-border M&As has recently introduced 
country factors (such as economic development, capital market development, 
trade openness, and legal standards) as important factors in explaining post-
merger performance, the openness of financial markets is not necessarily highly 
correlated with these institutional measures. For example, the financial markets in 
emerging countries have only started to experience significant openness during 
the 1990s’ ((see, Bekaert and Harvey, 2002; Levine and Zervos, 1998 and Edison 
and Warnock, 2002; among others). 
  We note that there are equally plausible reasons to believe that global 
diversification could reduce shareholder wealth. For example, it is more complex 
to manage a diversified global firm than a domestic one (Harris et al, 1982 and 
Myerson, 1982; Bodnar et al, 1999). This complexity may reduce the value that a 
firm can reap from diversifying globally. Therefore, even when benefits of 
creating an efficient international internal market do exist as proposed earlier, we 
may not be able to observe them from the ex-post value of the merged firm. We 
however do not expect such costs to be the same for all mergers. For instance, 
firms with managers that are experienced in managing a complex diversified firm 
may face much less difficulties than those of focused firms who are diversifying 
for the first time via cross-border M&As. 
  In addition, we would also expect that focused firms diversifying globally for 
the first time would be less likely to diversify into segmented financial capital 
markets due to the absence of managerial skills of managing a both globally and 
industrially diversified firm and the level of information asymmetry. The high 
agency costs in terms of monitoring unrelated foreign operations in a less 
developed economy may have adverse effect on the firm’s market value. 
Therefore, the announcement effect of firms who still choose to diversify into 
these countries are likely to be significantly less positive than if they were to 
diversify into a more integrated capital market. Importantly, this lower value is 
also likely to be exacerbated given the likely absence or lack of skill and 
experience associated with managing a complex and diversified organization. 
  Therefore, this study extends the existing literature by providing evidence on 
how the differences in financial market integration across countries impact the 
performance of firms that diversify internationally. Specifically, this paper 
examines the stock market reaction of US acquiring firms involved in cross-
border M&As. The choice of US bidding firms are primarily due to the important 
and dominating role of US firms in the foreign direct investment (FDI) market. In  
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fact, it is the largest capital inflow and outflow country and therefore, by studying 
cross-border M&As affiliated with the US market, we are able to provide a much 
richer understanding on the subject matter. Additionally, the US capital markets 
are fully integrated. The benefits to segmented financial markets of creating an 
efficient international internal capital market should therefore be among, if not the 
highest. One can only observe value enhancement when the benefits of global 
diversification exceeds the costs. The possible largest gap of financial market 
integration (eg US versus segmented markets) enables us to identify such benefits. 
  Examining 1,491 US bidders, we find that on average US shareholders gain 
statistically significant, 0.96% cumulative abnormal returns following the 
announcement of cross-border M&As. Firms that acquire targets from financially 
segmented countries experience statistically significant 1.31% abnormal returns 
while those that acquire targets from integrated countries experience only 0.90% 
abnormal returns. The positive difference in the announcement effects between 
the transactions involved with segmented targets and integrated targets is 
statistically significant and is driven by deals conducted between unrelated 
industries, which report 2.03% cumulative abnormal returns for US bidding firms’ 
shareholders and it is significantly higher than the 0.96% cumulative abnormal 
returns of those unrelated deals completed in financially integrated countries. 
Related transactions do not show significantly different announcement effects for 
firms acquiring targets from either type of markets. Although our findings in 
support of an efficient internal capital markets in unrelated transactions is not 
consistent with the implications of Stein (1997)’s view that internal capital 
markets may work best among firms that are more focused, however, it is 
consistent with the results of the studies in cross-border acquisitions by Doukas 
and Travlos (1988) and Eun, Kolodny and Scheraga (1996), in which firms’ 
wealth-maximizing objective is better served when expanding into new industries. 
  All of the major findings of the event study are supported in cross-section 
regression analysis. In addition we also find some support for our conjecture that 
firms need to acquire some experience and skill of managing a multinational 
diversified organization first in order to capture any benefits created by an 
efficient international internal capital markets. 
  To provide further evidence on the effect of market integration on cross-
border M&As, we examine the operating performance of merging firms pre- and 
post-merger. We find that for firms taking over targets in unrelated business, both 
the raw and industry-adjusted average performance changes are positive and 
significant, with the performance improvement particularly strong for firms taking 
over targets from segmented markets. The strong performance improvement in 
firms taking over segmented targets is consistent with the event study results, thus 
providing strong support of our underlying hypothesis that shareholders respond 
more favorably, the higher the expectations of economic improvement.  
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  Our paper adds to the literature in several ways. First, we provide a link 
between financial market integration and the value of cross-border M&As. Our 
results suggest that firms from segmented financial markets can overcome the 
usual firm-level capital constraints by being acquired by firms from integrated 
capital markets. Second, we use a broader set of countries (and longer sample 
period) and therefore provide a more comprehensive analysis on the value of 
global diversification across countries than the other existing studies on cross-
border M&As. Specifically, our sample contains targets from 68 countries. Of 
these countries, 23 of them have financially integrated capital markets with the 
others having segmented capital markets. In summary, the paper puts forward the 
importance of the financial market integration status of the countries to which the 
merged firms are from in evaluating the performance of global diversification 
related decisions. 
  Furthermore, analyzing the cross border decisions from an internal capital 
market perspective provides a new and significant link to the literature. To our 
knowledge, there is no study that formally investigates the relationship between 
the announcement effects and the post-merger operating performance changes of 
cross-boarder M&As with the degree of financial market segmentation of merging 
firms’ affiliated countries using the framework of internal capital markets. Fauver, 
Houston and Naranjo (2003) conduct a study that is closest in spirit to our study 
and find that the ‘diversification discount’ in the US market does not exist in 
countries with less access to foreign capital. Our study, on the other hand, focuses 
on how the financial integration status of different countries impacts shareholders’ 
value of bidding firms during global diversification initiatives. It must be pointed 
out, however, that our cross-border diversification analysis complements the work 
of Fauver, Houston and Naranjo (2003) on domestic diversification. This 
complimentary result is important as recent research by Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2002) suggests that cross-border acquisitions differ from domestic 
transactions. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the 
literature; section 3 describes the data and statistical methodology employed in the 
analysis; section 4 presents and discusses the event study results; section 5 
provides evidence of post-merger operating performance changes; and section 6 




2  Literature and hypothesis 
Existing studies on the wealth effects of acquiring firms in cross-border M&As 
provide mixed results. Early studies, by Doukas and Travlos (1988), Morck and 
Yeung (1992), Lang and Ofek (1995), among others, document that the firm’s 
market value is positively associated to its multinational operations and that the 
benefits might come from the expansion of firms’ network and the utilization of 
information-based intangible assets. Doukas (1995) further investigates gains 
from foreign acquisitions from free cash flow and growth opportunity 
perspectives. He reports that bidder abnormal returns are substantially higher for 
high Q bidders than low Q bidders and that free cash flow is inversely related to 
bidder returns for low Q bidders. Kiymaz and Mukherjee (2000) posit that the 
benefits of cross-boarder diversification are inversely related to the extent of co-
movement in the economies of the bidders and targets’ countries. 
  The more recent studies offer contrasting results. Moeller and Schlingemann 
(2002) find that US acquirers experience significantly lower stock and operating 
performance in cross-border M&A activities than they do following domestic 
transactions. The authors report a negative association between an increased 
global and industrial diversification and stock performance. They conjecture that 
the lower gains for cross-border transactions due to the acquirers’ inability to 
correctly value or capture synergies in cross-border takeovers. Using an excess 
value measure (see, eg, Berger and Ofek, 1995) Denis, Denis and Yost (2002), 
explore the valuation consequences of global diversification and report that, on 
average, globally diversified firms trade at a discount relative to a portfolio of 
single-segment, domestic firms operating in the same industries. They therefore 
conclude that global diversification, like industrial diversification, is associated 
with a reduction in value for the average firm. 
  These conflicting results therefore raise the following question: “Do Cross-
border M&As Add Value to Acquiring firms’ Shareholders?” Theoretical 
arguments suggest that diversification can have both positive and negative effects 
on firm value. In his ‘winner-picking’ model, Stein (1997) suggests that firms 
tend to transfer capital from divisions with lower growth opportunities to those 
with higher growth opportunities but face capital constraints. On the other hand, 
Scharfstein and Stein (2000) using a two-tier agency model argue that there is a 
dark side to internal capital market and suggest that, headquarter executives will 
over-allocate capital to rent-seeking divisional managers. 
  Both the bright side and dark side of internal capital market can be manifested 
in cross-border M&As. So far, it is an open question as to whether cross-border 
M&As do create or destroy value and the answer depends on the trade off 
between the costs and benefits associated with the transactions. We conjecture 
that given the existence of financial market segmentation where there are  
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countries with less access to foreign capital, it is plausible at least in some cases 
from an internal capital market perspective, that the benefits created by the merger 




3.1  Sample selection and descriptive analysis 
To conduct this study, we collected, from the Worldwide M&A section of the 
SDC Platinum Database all US affiliated cross-border M&As that took place over 
the 1990 to 2003 time period in which US firms were the acquirers. We obtain 
information on i) the identities of the firms involved in the mergers or 
acquisitions, ii) the status of the transactions, iii) the nation of target firms for US 
bidders, iv) the friendly or hostile information of the deal, v) the primary four 
digit SIC codes for both acquirers and targets, vi) the tender offer flag, vii) the 
payment methods, viii) the number of SIC codes that the acquirers and targets are 
active in, and ix) the shares owned by acquirers after the transaction. This 
provides us with 15,851 completed cross-borders M&As. Among these 15,851 US 
outbound transactions, 9,109 were conducted by public US firms. Given that our 
intention is to study the stock market reaction to firms’ international M&A 
announcements, we dropped the transactions associated with private acquirers. 
Furthermore, we select our sample according to the following criteria: 
 
–  No M&As conducted by firms from utility industries; 
–  No M&As conducted by firms from financial industries; 
–  Shares acquired is larger than 50%; 
–  Transaction value information is available; 
–  Transaction value is larger than or equal to $10million; 
–  Payment information available; 
 
Therefore, the sample size reduces to 1,706 US acquirers. In order to conduct a 
meaningful event study, we follow the procedure that requires all acquirers have 
stock price information at least 265 days before the announcement date allowing 
us to conduct an estimation based on 255-day window 10 days prior to the 
announcement. Incorporating this criterion using CRSP data, we end up with a 
final sample of 1,491 US acquirers in our study. Accounting related data for the 
acquirers are taken from Compustat whereas the same data for the non-US targets 
are collected from the Worldscope database. 
  It is well known in the literature that the task of measuring capital account 
liberalization is notoriously difficult. Researchers in the finance literature have  
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conducted several studies focusing on the exact timing of financial liberalizations 
and treating them as one-time events or structural breaks (Bekaert and Harvey, 
1995, 2002). Edison and Warnock (2001) on the other hand, present a readily 
available measure, namely the intensity of capital controls associated with 29 
emerging market countries, that is based on the degree of restrictions on foreign 
ownership of equities. In this study, we use a measure that is a combination of the 
above two for several reasons. First, Edison and Warnock cover almost all 
emerging countries that went through financial liberalization during the 1990s and 
those countries happen to be included in our study. Second, in order to have a 
comparative perspective, instead of the use of continuous measurement of capital 
constraints by Edison and Warnock, we follow the binary measurement of Bekaert 
and Harvey. This means that if the target market is segmented identified either by 
Bekaert and Harvey or Edison and Warnock, then it is assigned a value of 1 and 0 
otherwise. It is important to note that the measure of financial market integration 
used here is a broader measure of a country’s openness to capital markets 
especially to foreign investors and therefore a firms’ ability to access capital from 
foreign capitals.
1 Hence, we group countries participated in US affiliated cross-
border M&As intro financially fully integrated countries and not fully integrated 
countries (termed as ‘segmented financial markets’). Those emerging markets that 
are not covered by Edison and Warnock (2001) and Bekaert and Harvey (1995), 
(2002), are relatively smaller and less integrated countries (markets) and are 
assumed to be financially segmented countries or markets. 
  Table 1 presents the distribution of the observations in our study by countries 
and financial market integration status for both US acquirers and US targets. 
Among the 1,491 US bidders, 1,275 (85.50%) went to integrated markets and 215 
(14.50%) went to segmented markets. Firms from United Kingdom acquired by 
US bidders account for about 24% of the total cross-border M&As, while firms 
from Canada, Germany and France account for 14.70%, 9.60% and 8.20%, 
respectively. Among those 215 firms from segmented financial markets, 34 are 
from Brazil, 28 from Mexico, and 25 from Argentina. 
  Table 2 presents the distribution of the observation sorted by years and 
financial market integration status. The number of cross-border M&As increases 
steadily and rapidly from 1994 and starts declining in 1998. Firms from integrated 
markets account for the majority of the targets involved in US outbound cross-
border M&As while there is an increasing amount of transactions involved with 
firms from segmented markets. The steadily increasing number of firms from 
segmented financial markets participating in US affiliated cross-border M&As is 
consistent with the trend of more interactions between industrialized countries and 
emerging countries in the last decade. 
                                                 
1 The other strand of studies in international finance that tests capital market integration usually 
focuses on the commonality in returns or cost of capital across markets. This literature therefore 
provides a joint test of the asset pricing model used and the integration hypothesis.  
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Table 1.   Frequency by target countries 
 
We use the integration measure reported in Bekaert and Harvey (1995) and use countries 
reported in Edison and Warnock (2001) to complement the list of emerging markets 
reported in Bekaert and Harvey. In this table, we present frequency of countries by 
grouping them into financially integrated countries and segmented integrated countries if 
they are not fully integrated. 
 
Target countries sorted by financial market integration 
Integrated markets    Segmented markets 
Country name  Observations    Country name   Observations 
United Kingdom  359    Brazil 34 
Canada 219    Mexico 28 
Germany 143    Argentina 25 
France 123    China 14 
Australia 66    South Korea  14 
Netherlands 55    India 13 
Italy 36    Puerto Rico  8 
Switzerland 34    Taiwan 8 
Israel 32    Chile 7 
Sweden 27    Peru 6 
Japan 23    Egypt 4 
Norway 20    Malaysia 4 
Spain 19    Venezuela 4 
Denmark 17    Colombia 3 
Hong Kong  15    Czech Republic  3 
Belgium 14    Indonesia 3 
Ireland-Rep 14    Czechoslovakia 2 
South Africa  14    Hungary 2 
New Zealand  12    Neth Antilles  2 
Finland 11    Philippines 2 
Poland 11    Portugal 2 
Singapore 7    Russian Fed  2 
Austria 5    Slovenia 2 
     Thailand 2 
     Others
a 21 
Subtotal 1276    Subtotal  215 
Total 1491
a ’Others’ includes countries of Pakistan, Algeria, Bahamas, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, 
British Virgin, Costa Rica, Ghana, Guatemala, Guernsey, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, 




Table 2.   Frequency by years 
 
We use the integration measures reported in Edison and Warnock (2001). Specifically, 
we use their intensity of capital controls measure in each year, but we convert it to one 
minus their measure so that its interpretation is consistent with capital market openness to 
foreign investors. In this table, we present frequency of countries by grouping them into 
financially integrated countries and financially segmented countries sorted by year. 
 
Year  All markets  Integrated markets  Segmented markets 
1990 40  37  3 
1991 38  37  1 
1992 55  50  5 
1993 52  47  5 
1994 68  56  12 
1995 100  85  15 
1996 131  106  25 
1997 158  131  27 
1998 195  171  24 
1999 166  140  26 
2000 150  125  25 
2001 114  92  22 
2002 115  104  11 
2003 109  95  14 
Total  1491 1276  215 
 
 








1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
All Markets Integrated Markets Segmented Markets
 




Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics highlighting the characteristics of US 
bidders and the associated deals. The average size of transactions involved in 
taking over targets from integrated markets is significantly larger than that from 
segmented ones. One reason might be that US acquirers have been cautious in 
acquiring large size targets from less developed markets in order to minimize risk 
exposure. The size of the US acquirers, however, shows an opposite pattern – 
bigger firms are more likely to go to segmented markets than the smaller ones. 
Most of the sample cross-border M&As are financed fully by cash payments. This 
is consistent with the patterns reported by Rossi and Volpin (2004) in cross-border 
M&As worldwide. The results also suggest that cash payment is more prevalent in 
taking over segmented targets. The average number of SIC codes that US bidders 
are active in is 5.42, indicating that firms conducting global diversification are 
already diversified domestically. This is consistent with our conjecture and the 
findings of Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) that in the US, more diversified firms 
are more likely to go global. As reported in Table 3, only about 10% of the 
transactions in our sample are conducted by focused US bidders who diversify 
first time through cross-border M&As. 
  Table 3 also reports the specific source of the payment. We collect these 
payment details from the SDC data base. Specifically, money could be paid 
through existing line of credit of the US acquirers and/or through corporate funds. 
Usually, managers have more discretion on the disposal of corporate funds while 
the usage of the line of credit is verified through the creditors’ stringent scrutiny. 
The results show that corporate funds are used significantly more frequently when 
taking over integrated targets. The free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986) suggests 
that managers have the incentive to conduct mergers that are consistent with the 
maximization of personal goals and perks over other priorities. Using corporate 
funds other than other forms of capital (eg, borrowings or line of credits) makes 
such expropriation easier to manage and execute. Therefore we expect that the 
market would react more negatively when corporate funds are used to take over a 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4  Event study analysis 
4.1 Abnormal  returns 
To conduct the event study, we apply the standard event study methodology and 
make the standard assumption that security returns are driven by a single-index 
market model. Table 4 presents the abnormal returns to US bidders around the 
announcement of cross-border acquisition (t=0). Panel A shows that US bidders’ 
shareholders experience significant and positive abnormal returns of 0.69%. This 
is significantly higher than the abnormal returns of the bidders during the 1980s’ 
cross-border transactions as reported in the study of Kiymaz and Mukherjee 
(2000) which is 0.21% and insignificant. The three day cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) reported in panel B around period t = (-1, 1) for US bidders are 
1.02% and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
  Table 5 reports the three day CARs around period t = (-1, 1) for US bidders in 
cross-boarder M&As dis-aggregated by target countries’ financial market 
integration and the relatedness of the transactions. To make our results sorted by 
the relatedness more comparable with others (Berger and Ofek, 1995; and Lamont 
and Polk, 2002) among others we follow the definition of relatedness in the extant 
literature of global diversification. That is, if the merging firms report operations 
in the same-two-digit SIC code industries, we classify the acquisition as related 
and otherwise as unrelated. To classify relatedness this way, our results based on 
event study could also be comparable with those that are based on excess value 
method (Bodnar et al, 1999 and Denis et al, 2002). 
  Table 5 shows that the three day CARs of those US bidders going to 
financially integrated markets and those to financially segmented markets are 
significantly different from each other. Bidding firms going to segmented markets 
experience significant 1.31% cumulative abnormal returns which is 0.41% higher 
than that of those going to integrated markets and the difference is significant at 
the 10% level. As is shown in the table, the difference in the CARs between firms 
going to these two types of markets is driven by the unrelated transactions. While 
the CARs of the related transactions are almost the same between the firms taking 
over targets from either types of markets, they are significantly different (0.82% 
and 2.03%, respectively) in unrelated transactions. This is consistent with the 
results reported in Doukas and Travlos (1988) and Eun, Kolodny and Scheraga 
(1996) that the returns are higher for firms expand into a new line of business in 
cross-border M&As. Indeed, as pointed out by Shapiro (1982), it is matter of 
survival rather than a search for abnormal profits when firms becoming 
multinational. We believe that firms are seeking abnormal profits when taking 
over targets in unrelated industries from segmented markets where good quality 
projects might be passed up due to the shortage of funding. Acquiring related  
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transactions, however, given everything else equal, may signal a firm’s limited 
capacity to extract additional benefits from its existing operations. 
 
Table 4.   Acquirers abnormal returns 
 
This table shows event study results for 1,491 US bidders. The estimation window is 
from (-265, -11) while the event window is from (-10, 10). To be included in the event 
study, the observations must have at least 255 days stock information available 10 days 
prior the announcement. Panel A shows average daily abnormal returns while panel B 
shows the cumulative abnormal returns for several windows. 
 
Panel A. Average daily abnormal returns (AARs) 
 
Days AARs  (%) Z-statistic
-10 0.11  1.05
-9 -0.04  0.33
-8 0.02  -0.38
-7 -0.07  -0.49
-6 0.02  0.13
-5 -0.06  -0.67
-4 -0.10  -1.59*
-3 -0.03  -0.16
-2 0.22  2.81**
-1 0.09  1.09
0 0.69  8.45***
1 0.24  4.53***
2 -0.06  0.57
3 0.03  0.91
4 0.00  0.06
5 0.04  0.32
6 -0.05  -0.22
7 -0.01  0.05
8 -0.09  -1.02
9 -0.04  -0.89
10 -0.08  -1.42*
 
Panel B. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
 
Windows CARs  (%) Z-Statistic
(-10, -2) 0.08  0.34
(-5, -2) 0.03  0.19
(-1, 1) 1.02  8.12***
(-5, 5) 1.05  4.91***
(-10, 10) 0.83  2.93**
 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As discussed earlier, firms without the experience and skill of managing a 
complex and diversified organization prior to the cross-border M&As will be 
more reluctant to undertake global acquisitions of firms from segmented markets. 
In our sample, only 5 (about 8.92%) out of 56 of focused US bidders that 
diversify globally and industrially at the same time chose to go to segmented 
markets and these 5 firms report a lower and insignificant abnormal returns than 
those already diversified US bidders that also merge with firms from segmented 
markets. In these cases, it appears that the benefits of an efficient internal capital 
market do not outweigh the costs. 
  Finally, the results in Table 5 also indicate that focused US bidders that 
choose to diversify both industrially and globally for their first time but whose 
target is from integrated markets experience significant and positive CARs of 
2.77%. This return is significantly higher than that experienced by the diversified 
bidders. Our results are consistent with the findings of Doukas (1995) who reports 
that financial markets reward firm’s first global diversification more than its 
subsequent ones. Doukas and Travlos (1988) argue that the initial investment in a 
country may allow a firm to exploit more of any cross-country imperfections. 
Therefore, by controlling those first time diversifying firms, the benefits of the 
created internal capital market would be even more significant when studying the 
effect of financial market integration in cross-border M&As. 
 
 
4.2 Cross-section  analysis 
In this sub-section, we are interested in determining whether the observed 
financial market integration effects survive after controlling for the effects of 
variables known to explain CARs following M&As announcements. Specifically, 
we perform cross-section analysis where we include along with our measure of 
the degree of integration the following control variables – the relatedness of the 
transactions, the relative size of the transactions, the payment method, the source 
of the payment, the organizational type of target firms in the cross-border M&As, 
the size of the acquirers, and the diversification status of the acquirers (focused or 
not) prior to the current transaction. 
  Table 6 presents results of the regression analysis. Models 1 to 3 include all 
unrelated transactions, and models 4 to 6 include all related ones. Results from 
models 1 to 3 indicate that the impact of financial market integration on acquiring 
firms’ CARs remains statistically significant after controlling for other effects. 
Interestingly we find that the effect of the level of integration is particularly 
important when corporate funds are used as the payment method. Specifically, the 
payment by corporate fund itself either has significant and negative impact in 
related transactions (as shown in models 4 to 6) or has insignificantly impact in 
unrelated transactions (as shown in models 1 to 3). The interaction variable of  
22 
variables ‘Corp. fund’ and ‘Segmented’, however, has positive and significant 
relationship with the bidding firms’ abnormal returns, especially in unrelated 
transactions. This finding is consistent with our conjecture that since corporate 
fund is easier for managers to access, therefore it is generally perceived by the 
investors as an abuse of managerial discretion when managers use corporate fund 
to take over related targets from integrated markets. On contrast, when corporate 
fund is used to take over segmented targets from unrelated industries, 
shareholders perceive such transactions as efficient ones because it provides 
managers with an opportunity to invest into projects that have high growth 
potential but may have been given up in countries with financial constraints. 
  The impact the size of the acquiring firm is consistent with that usually found 
in the literature, which reports that the size of the acquiring firms reduces value 
(see, eg, Moeller et al, 2004). The observed different announcement effects of 
focused and diversified acquirers from the event study are not statistically but 
economically significant, especially in unrelated transactions. The weak evidence 
is probably due to the small sample size. 
  Consistent with the event study results, the observed significant impact of 
financial market integration does not exist in related transactions. In related cross-
border M&As, it is the payment method and the source of payment that are 
statistically significantly. If cash is the only payment method in M&As with 
related targets, acquiring firms experience statistically significantly lower 
announcement effects, especially when valuable internal funds are used to take 
over targets from integrated markets. Shareholders perceive that these transactions 
do not add as much value as taking over segmented targets in unrelated industries 
and thus, respond less favorably. 
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Table 6.   Cross-sectional analysis for US bidders’ CARs 
     around  announcement  date 
 
The dependent variable is the three day abnormal returns of US bidders. ‘Segmented’ is a 
dummy variable and it is one if the foreign targets are from financially segmented 
markets, otherwise 0; ‘Related’ is a dummy variable and it is one if bidders and targets 
share the same two-digit SIC codes; Ln acq. is the natural logarithm of the size of 
acquiring firms’ market value; ‘All cash’ is a dummy variable and it is one if the 
transactions are paid in 100% cash, otherwise 0; ‘Public’ is one if the foreign target are 
public firms; ‘Relative size’ is the ratio of the actual size of the transaction to the actual 
size of the market value of the acquiring firm; ‘Focused’ is one if US bidders operate in 
only one industry; ‘Line of credit’ refers to that the transaction is financed (at least 
partially) by the acquirers’ line of credits; ‘Corp. fund’ refers to whether the transaction is 
financed (wholly or partially) by internal funds; ‘Segmented*Line of credit’ is an 
interaction variable of ‘Segmented’ and ‘Line of credit’ and ‘Segmented*Corp. fund’ is 
an interaction variable of ‘Segmented’ and ‘Corp. fund’. 
 
 Unrelated  Related 






































































































Line of credit 
   -0.110* 
(0.086) 




   0.290*** 
(0.000) 
   0.061** 
(0.050) 
Obs.  621 621 621 810 810 810 
Adjusted 
R-square 
0.024 0.038 0.055 0.029 0.035 0.037 




5 Operating  performance 
This section provides additional evidence on the role of financial market 
integration in cross-border M&As by comparing changes in operating 
performance between transactions involved with targets from segmented capital 
markets and those from integrated capital markets. 
  Following Healy et al (1992) and Moeller et al (2005), we use both raw and 
industry-adjusted operating cash flows, defined as revenue minus cost of goods 
sold minus selling and general expenses minus change in working capital, as our 
measures of operating performance. The operating cash flows are normalized by 
the market value of assets at the beginning of the year, defined as the sum of the 
market value of equity, book value of preferred stock, book value of long-term 
debt and book value of current long-term debt. The pre-merger operation cash 
flows are defined as the weighted averages of target and acquirer values, with the 
weights being the relative asset values of the two firms. The post-merger 
operation cash flows is the bidder’s (merged firm) value after the acquisition is 
completed. The industry-adjusted measure for each firm is calculated by 
subtracting the mean of the corresponding year and the major SIC grouping from 
the raw operating performance measure. Due to the data requirements and the 
limited resources on foreign targets’ accounting information, the sample size 
reduces to 82 transactions with 74 integrated targets and 8 segmented targets. 
  Table 7 presents the raw and industry-adjusted operating cash flows pre- and 
post-merger sorted by target country’s financial market integration and the type of 
the transaction for each firm over the years [-5, -1] and [+1, +5]. For firms taking 
over targets in unrelated business, the raw average performance change is 0.012 
and the industry-adjusted performance change is 0.006. The performance 
improvement is particularly strong in firms taking over segmented targets, which 
is 0.044 without industry adjustment and 0.072 with industry adjustment. The 
strong performance improvement in firms taking over targets from segmented 
financial markets is consistent with the findings from the event study. It also 
provides support for our hypothesis that an efficient internal capital market is 
created, thereby resulting in additional benefits to global diversification, all else 
equal, if merging firms are from financial markets with different integration 
status.  
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Table 7.   Pre- and postmerger operation cash flows 
 
Operation cash flows are defined as revenue minus cost of goods sold minus selling and 
general expenses minus change in working capital. The operation cash flows are 
normalized by the market value of assets at the beginning of the year, defined as the sum 
of the market value of equity, book value of preferred stock, book value of long-term debt 
and book value of current long-term debt. The pre-merger operation cash flows is defined 
as the weighted averages of target and acquirer values, with the weights being the relative 
asset values of the two firms. The post-merger operation cash flows is the bidder’s values 
after the acquisition is completed. The industry-adjusted measure for each firm is 
calculated by subtracting the mean of the corresponding year and major SIC grouping 
from the raw operating performance measure. ‘Firm average’ reports the raw operation 
cash flows while ‘Industry-adjusted average’ reports for the adjusted values. Panel A and 
B report the operation cash flows for pre-merger and post-merger, respectively, while 
panel C reports the changes, which is the difference between the values of post-merger 
and those of pre-merger combined firm. 
 
Panel A. Pre-merger operation cash flows (-5, -1) 











All 0.104  0.012  48  0.106 0.013  34 
Segmented 0.074  -0.019  5  0.114  0.013  3 
Integrated 0.108  0.016  43 0.105  0.013  31 
Panel B. Postmerger operation cash flows (1, 5) 











All 0.087  -0.005  48  0.118 0.019  34 
Segmented 0.054  0.028  5  0.158  0.085  3 
Integrated 0.091  -0.0085  43 0.114  0.013  31 
Panel C. Average operation cash flows changes 














All -0.017  -0.017  48  0.012  0.006  34 
Segmented -0.020    0.047  5  0.044  0.072  3 





The average of the raw operating cash flows for firms conducting related 
transactions is 0.104 pre-merger and 0.087 post-merger, and the average changes 
is -0.017. The change in industry-adjusted operating cash flows is also -0.017. The 
negative operating performance changes are not consistent with the results of 
Healy et al (1992), which suggest a strong performance improvement for firms 
with highly overlapping businesses. We believe that the possible higher agency 
costs, information asymmetry and cultural differences in cross-border transactions 
may lead to a decrease in firm performance. Firms taking over targets from 
segmented financial markets, however, experience performance improvement 
compared to their industry counterparts for similar type of transactions. However, 
caution should be exercised in interpreting these results given the relatively small 
number of observations. 
  To test the relationship between post-merger performance changes in 
operating cash flows and abnormal stock returns at merger announcements we 
conduct cross-sectional analysis with the dependent variable being the three-day 
abnormal returns for acquiring firms around the event date. Table 8 contains the 
estimated coefficients. Models 1 and 2 include all observations with operating 
performance change data available. The coefficient of the industry-adjusted cash 
flows is positive and significant at the 1% level (the use of changes in raw cash 
flows provides similar results). This finding is consistent with the notion that the 
positive stock price reaction is due to the anticipated increase in expected cash 
flows resulting from the merger. Importantly, we find a positive and significant 
relation between the interaction of ‘Segmented’ and ‘Ind. adjusted changes’ 
indicating that shareholders value the anticipated changes more if the target is 
from a segmented financial market. Again, the positive relationship is driven by 
transactions in unrelated industries. 
  In sum, the results from the event study and the post-merger operating 
performance analysis are consistent with our conjecture that the increase in value 
for acquiring firms in cross-border M&As is the highest if the pair of merging 
firms are from countries (or markets) with different and possibly opposite 
financial market integration status, especially for unrelated transactions. Empirical 
evidence from the US domestic markets indicates that diversified firms trade at a 
value discount and that there is a positive stock price reaction when firms expand 
into related business areas. However, here we find that even for unrelated firms, 
there is a positive and significant stock price reaction for acquirers, especially if 
the target is from a segmented financial market. We attribute this finding to the 
fact that, in general, firms in segmented capital markets do not have easy access to 
sufficient capital to exploit the growth opportunities that they are confronted with. 
Therefore, when they are merged or acquired by firms from integrated financial 
markets, they are afforded the opportunity to obtain new and additional funding, 
thus allowing them to exploit their growth opportunities. The positive changes in 
the operational cash flows of the consolidated firm add credence to this argument.  
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Table 8.   US bidders CARs explained by operating 
     performance  changes 
 
The dependent variable is the three day abnormal returns of US bidders. ‘Ind. adjusted 
changes’ is the changes of the industry adjusted operation cash flows; ‘Segmented’ is a 
dummy variable and it is one if the foreign targets are from financially segmented 
markets, otherwise 0; ‘Related’ is a dummy variable and it is one if bidders and targets 
share the same two-digit SIC code; ‘Ln acq.’ is the natural logarithm of the size of 
acquiring firms’ market value; ‘All cash’ is a dummy variable and it is one if the 
transactions are paid in 100% cash, otherwise 0; ‘Public’ is one if the foreign target are 
public firms; ‘Relative size’ is the ratio of the actual size of the transaction to the actual 
size of the market value of the acquiring firm; ‘Focused’ is one if US bidders operate in 
only one industry; ‘Line of credit’ refers to whether the transaction is financed (at least 
partially) by the acquirers’ line of credit; ‘Corp. fund’ refers to whether the transaction is 
financed (wholly or partially) by internal funds. 
 
 All  Unrelated  Related 






















































































































      
Obs.  75 75 30 30  45  45 
Adjusted 
R-square 
0.411 0.414 0.477 0.502  0.417  0.423 





We contend that an efficient international internal capital market can be created in 
cross-border M&As when the pair of the merging firms come from financial 
markets characterized by different degrees of integration. This efficiency is most 
likely to be present in unrelated transactions. To test this hypothesis, we examine 
the cross-sectional differences in announcement effects of 1,491 US bidders, with 
targets from 68 countries of which, 23 have financially integrated capital markets 
and 45 have financially segmented capital markets, spanning the 1990–2003 
period. Our regression results demonstrate that the financial market integration 
status of targets’ home countries has a statistically significant relation with the 
announcement effects for US bidders. And this relation is driven primarily by 
unrelated transactions. The importance of the degree of financial market 
integration does not diminish when we control for other institutional or firm-
specific factors that have been shown to explain abnormal returns associated with 
M&A announcements. 
  The results from post-merger operating performance confirm our event study 
findings. We find that there is a positive relationship between post-merger 
operating performance and the bidders’ abnormal returns. This is consistent with 
the hypothesis of capital market efficiency that shareholders of acquiring firms 
response favorably due to the fact that they expect an improvement in the 
operating performance in taking over targets from segmented markets because 
capital can be transferred to divisions (the acquired targets) that faced higher 
financial constraints prior to the merger. 
  In summary, we argue that the value of global diversification vary with the 
target countries’ capital market integration. The findings from both the stock price 
reaction and post-merger operating performance support our conjecture that the 
performance of the merged firm is enhanced when the merging firms are from 
countries or markets with different or opposite financial market integration status. 
This perspective is plausible because the firms from segmented markets are likely 
to resolve some of their capital constraints as more capital may be available and 
transferred internally from the firms from integrated capital markets to the 
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